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DEPOSING UNNAMED PLAINTIFFS IN CLASS ACTIONS:
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
v. SUPERIOR COURT'
Discovery and class actions are two of the most important procedural devices in present California legal practice. 2 Although they are
often assumed to be fairly modefin developments, both can trace their
ancestory back to at least 1851 when the original Practice Act was
enacted in California.3 Section 14 of that Act4 is practically identical to
section 382 of the present Code of Civil Procedure, 5 the modern statutory basis for class actions. Other sections of the 1851 statutes are related to various discovery devices including depositions, The discovery statutes, unlike the class action statute, have undergone massive
changes since 1851, the most important occurring in 1957 when
the entire discovery procedure was revamped using the federal discovery rules as a model.7 Despite the admitted importance of these
two devices, it was not until 1972 that the California Supreme Court
considered the application of any type of discovery proceduie to unnamed plaintiffs in a class action. In a unanimous decision, the court
in Southern CaliforniaEdison Co. v. Superior Court8 held that a defendant in a class action has the right to force the named plaintiffs to obtain the attendance of unnamed plaintiffs at depositions by the same
notice procedure used in individual actions, that is, by merely serving
plaintiff's attorney with notice of the proposed taking of the deposition.
But the court also held that plaintiff's attorney could avoid the impact of
the procedure if he could demonstrate that "good cause" existed for the
issuance of a protective order shifting the burden of discovery to the de1. 7 Cal. 3d 832, 500 P.2d 621, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1972).

2. See, Grossman, Class Actions: Manageability and the Fluid Recovery Doctrine, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 415 (1972); Committee on Administration of Justice,
Discovery, 31 CAL. ST. BJ. 204 (1956); 20 STAN. L. REv. 594 (1968).
3. Ch. 5 [1851] Cal. Stat. 51.
4. Id. § 14.
5. CAL. CODE Crv. PROc. § 382 (West Supp. 1973).
6. Ch. 5, §§ 428-31 [18511 Cal. Stat. 118-19. Section 428-1st, allowed the deposition of a person "for whose immediate benefit the action or proceeding is prosecuted
or defended" to be taken in "special proceedings." See text accompanying notes
11-16 infra.
7. Ch. 1904 [1957] Cal. Stat. 3321; see Committee on Administration of Justice,
Discovery, 31 CAL. ST. B.J. 204 (1956).
8. 7 Cal. 3d 832, 500 P.2d 621, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1972).

NOTES
fendant. The court proceeded to define "good cause" in'a way which
should insure that named plaintiffs will seldom be required to obtain
the attendance of unnamed plaintiffs for depositions.
The five named plaintiffs in Edison owned boats moored in King
Harbor at Redondo Beach. They commenced an action for damages
in nuisance and trespass, bringing suit on behalf of themselves and all
those similarly situated. Plaintiffs alleged that Edison, in the course
of operating an electrical power generation plant, had discharged large
quantities of particulate matter and pollutants which had damaged their
boats. The complaint further alleged that there were approximately
1500 other boat owners so situated and that the issues raised were of
common and general interest to all. 9
Edison answered and then began discovery proceedings. Plaintiffs
supplied a list' 0 of the names and last known addresses of approximately
500 members of the King Harbor Boat Association, from which Edison
picked twenty names at random and served notice of the taking of their
depositions on the attorneys for the named plaintiffs, taking the position
that section 2019(a)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure" required the
named plaintiffs to produce the deponents at the noticed time and
place. Section 2019 describes the procedure for the taking of oral depositions. These may be had from any person, irrespective of his relation to the action. The party seeking discovery is required to give notice of the taking of the deposition to all other parties, and usually
must serve a subpoena on the deponent in order to compel his attendance, but subsection (a)(4) provides that subpoenas need not be
served on three categories of deponents: (a) parties, (b) officers,
directors, and managing agents of parties, and (c) persons "for whose
immediate benefit an action or proceeding is prosecuted oi defended." The burdent of compelling attendance of a person falling
9. Id. at 835-36, 500 P.2d at 622, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
10. This list was apparently supplied in response to interrogatories, but the reports
are not clear on this point.
11. CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 2019(a) (4) (West Supp. 1973):
In the case of depositions of a party to the record of any civil action or proceeding or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition is an officer, director
or managing agent of any such party, the service of a subpoena upon any such
deponent is not required if proper notice of the taking of such deposition is
given to the attorney for such party or to the party, if he has no attorney. In the
case of depositions of a person for whose immediate benefit an action or proceeding is prosecuted or defended or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition is an officer, director or managing agent of any such person, the service of a
subpoena upon any such deponent is not required if proper notice of the taking
of such deposition is given to the attorney of the party prosecuting or defending
the action or proceeding for the immediate benefit of the deponent or to such
party, if he has no attorney.
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within one of these categories is on the attorney representing the interest associated with that person. When the attorney receives proper
notice of the deposition, it is his responsibility to insure that the deponent appears at the noticed time and place.
Section 2019 is the only discovery section which makes special provision for discovery from persons "immediately benefited" by the ac12
tion. The other sections are limited in their application to parties,
parties and agents of parties,"3 or "any person" without reference to
the person's relation to the action. 4 Thus, while neither "party" nor
"person immediately benefited" are defined in the California codes, the
inclusion of the category of "persons immediately benefited" in section 2019 and its omission from the other discovery sections indicates
that the legislature viewed persons in these various categories as bearing
different relationships to the action and thereby deserving of differing treatment. 15 Edison claimed that unnamed plaintiffs are immediately benefited by the action within the meaning of section 2019(a)(4)
and that the attorney for the named plaintiffs therefore had the burden
of securing the attendance of the unnamed class members at the depositions. 16
Although the plaintiffs disagreed with this application of the section, they did attempt to cooperate in the production of the unnamed
plaintiffs. They were able to produce only two of the twenty persons on
Edison's list: the rest could not be contacted, were unable to attend, or refused to attend. Thereupon, Edison noticed the taking of
the depositions of twenty more of the class members, and "announced
its intention to exclude' 7 from the class ali those who did not appear.
Plaintiffs moved for a protective order under section 2019(b)(1),
claiming that this practice was subjecting them to "annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression."' 8 The motion requested an order limiting the use of the notice procedure to the five named plaintiffs. The
12. Id. § 2030 (interrogatories), 2031 (inspection of records and entry upon
property), and 2033 (requests for admissions).
13. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 2032 (West 1967) (physical or mental examination).
14. Id. § 2020 (depositions upon written interrogatories).
15. The same distinction is made elsewhere in the California codes. See, e.g., CAL.
CODE Civ. PRoc. § 2016 (West 1967), § 2034 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. EviD.
CODE § 776 (West 1968).
16. 7 Cal. 3d at 836, 500 P.2d at 622-23, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
17. Id., 500 P.2d at 623, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 711. The claim of a "right" to exclude non-appearing class members was based on CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2034(d)
(West Supp. 1973). See text accompanying notes 76-79 infra.
18. 7 Cal. 3d at 836, 500 P.2d at 623, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 711, quoting CAL. CODE
Cirv. PRoc. § 2019(b)(1) (West Supp. 1973).

1973]

NOTES

trial court granted the motion in part, quashing Edison's notices of deposition but holding that if Edison first served subpoenas on the deponents, the depositions could be taken. 19 As noted previously, this
is the procedure normally required when the deponent does not fall
within one of the categories exempted from the subpoena provision by
subsection (a) (4).20 The trial court reasoned that since "it is an unwarranted and improper burden upon counsel for the plaintiff[s] to
require that he produce them on pain of a forfeiture to those persons
if the counsel cannot produce them,"'" the unnamed plaintiffs should
not be considered as within the ambit of section 2019(a) (4), and
therefore the defendants were required to serve subpoenas on those
unnamed plaintiffs they wished to depose.
Edison filed a petition with the court of appeal. That court issued
a preemptory writ vacating the lower court's protective order, ruling
that unnamed plaintiffs are persons "for whose immediate benefit an
action . . .is prosecuted" within the meaning of section 2019(a)(4),
and, as such, their depositions could be required on mere notice. Furthermore, the court of appeal was of the opinion that there was no
other basis for issuing a protective order since plaintiffs had not provided good cause.2" The supreme court granted a hearing.
Apparently the sole question raised by the parties was whether the
unnamed plaintiffs were persons "for whose immediate benefit" the
action was being prosecuted. 23 They reasoned that if the unnamed
plaintiffs came within this category, the lower court's protective order was erroneous; if they did not, it was correct.
Edison, relying on the test enunciated in Waters v. Superior Court,24
argued that since class members would have an immediate right to
share pro rata in any judgment for the plaintiffs, they were immediate
beneficiaries. 25 In Waters, plaintiff brought an action for legal fees allegedly due from the Hughes Tool Company. In the course of the proceedings, he served notice of the taking of Howard Hughes' deposition
on the attorney for the defendant, who then moved for a protective
order requiring the service of a subpoena on Hughes. Plaintiff argued that since Hughes was the sole shareholder of the company, any
19. 7 Cal. 3d at 836-37, 500 P.2d at 623, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
20. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
21. 7 Cal. 3d at 837 n.4, 500 P.2d at 623 n.4, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 711 n.4.
22. 23 Adv. Cal. App. 3d 568, vacated, 7 Cal. 3d 832, 500 P.2d 621, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1972)).
23. 7 Cal. 3d at 840, 500 P.2d at 625, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
24. 58 Cal. 2d 885, 377 P.2d 265, 27 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962).
25. 7 Cal. 3d at 837-38, 500 P.2d at 624, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
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judgment for the company would be for his immediate benefit.
The supreme court disagreed, holding that before a person could
be considered one for whose immediate benefit an action is prosecuted or defended, he must be one "who would have an immediate
right to the amount recovered or some portion of it as soon as it was
recovered by the nominal party," 26 and that a sole shareholder was
not such a person when the action was against the company.
The plaintiffs in Edison replied that the Waters test should be limited to a situation in which a person prosecutes or defends an action
purely as a nominal party, for the immediate benefit of another. In
such a context, the statute would serve a useful purpose since the
benefited person would usually be more knowledgeable of the underlying facts of the case than the nominal party. In a class action, however, the converse is true because the party seeking the information
plaintiffs that
would normally be able to obtain little from unnamed
27
plaintiffs.
named
the
from
obtain
otherwise
not
he could
The plaintiffs further maintained that allowing depositions to be
taken from unnamed plaintiffs on mere notice with the sanction of exclusion from the class if they did not appear, would destroy the usefulness of the class action as an effective method of litigation and adjudication.28 While the supreme court recognized these considerations
to be forceful arguments, it could not accept an application of the Waters
test in a class action setting:2 9
[W]e find it impossible to reject the application of the Waters holding
to the instant case. At the outset it is manifest that the Waters interpretation, as an abstract proposition, makes sense: Persons "imniediately benefited" by the prosecution of an action are indeed those
"who would have an immediate right to the amount recovered or some
portion of it as soon as it was recovered by the nominal plaintiff."
"immediate benefit" than
There is probably no better way to construe
30
as an immediate share in the recovery.
As the court pointed out, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
use the phrase, so the persuasive authority of federal decisions was not
available. 3 1 Furthermore, there is no legislative history concerning
26. 58 Cal. 2d at 897, 377 P.2d at 271, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
27. 7 Cal. 3d at 838, 500 P.2d at 624, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
28. Id. at 838-39, 500 P.2d at 624, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
29. Id. at 840, 500 P.2d at 625, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
30. Id. at 839, 500 P.2d at 625, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
31. Id., 500 P.2d at 624-25, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13. For the use of federal precedents in discovery matters, see Coy v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 210, 218, 373 P.2d
457, 461, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393, 397 (1962). In the class action context, see La Sala v.
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section 2019 (a) (4), so recourse to this interpretative aid was like-

wise unavailable.32

Thus, by necessity, the court's construction of

the phrase "immediate benefit' was based entirely on the Waters precedent.
The plaintiffs' approach to this question implied that if the Waters

test was applicable in class actions, the unnamed plaintiffs would clearly
fall within the category of persons "immediately benefited" by the action. In support of this proposition the court placed reliance on La

Sala v. American Savings & Loan Association,3 3 in which it was
stated:
When a plaintiff sues on behalf of a class, he assumes a fiduciary obligation to the members of the class . . . . Even if the named plaintiff receives all the benefits that he seeks in the complaint, such success
does not divest him of the duty to continue the action for the benefit of
34
others similarly situated.

The court stated that this holding concerning the "essential nature" of
class actions "impelled" them to conclude that, under the Waters test,

unnamed plaintiffs do belong to the category of persons immediately
benefited by a class action. 35
La Sala seems to be dubious authority for this holding. The case
concerned the named plaintiffs' duty to the class but did not involve the
Am. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 871-72, 489 P.2d 1113, 1116-17, 97 Cal. Rptr.
849, 853-54 (1971); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 815, 484 P.2d 964, 973,
94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 805 (1971).
32. Paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) was added to section 2019 by 1959 amendment Ch. 1590, § 2 [1959] Cal. Stat. 3920. While there is no legislative history
explaining the phrase "persons immediately benefited by the action" in section 2019
(a) (4), it does have a long history dating back to Lord Denham's Act of 1843, 687
Vict., c. 85, § I. That act was designed to be a liberalization of the rules of evidence
by allowing persons who had an interest in the action to be competent witnesses; however, it excluded from its operation certain categories of interested persons, one of
which was "any Person in whose immediate and individual Behalf any Action may be
brought or defended, either wholly or in part." Id. The New York Statutes of 1849,
ch. 438, H8 396, 398 [1849] N.Y. Stat. -, and the California Practice Act of 1851,
ch. 5, § 392, 393, 422, 428-1st [1851] Cal. Stat. 113, also used the phrase. While
the early cases construing the phrase were concerned with the competency of witnesses,
the holdings were generally consonant with the Waters holding. See, e.g., Freeman v.
Spalding, 12 N.Y. 261, 2 Kern. 373 (1855); Fitch v. Bates, 11 Barb. 471, 480 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1851); Vanduzen v. Worrel, 18 Barb. 409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851). The test
enunciated in Waters was taken from one of these early cases, Butler v. Patterson, 13
N.Y. 393, 3 Kern. 292, 294 (1855), in which the phrase was construed to apply only
to those persons who "would have a right to the amount recovered, or some portion of it, as soon as it should be recovered by the nominal plaintiff." Id.
33. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
34. Id. at 871, 489 P.2d at 1116, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
35. 7 Cal. 3d at 840, 500 P.2d at 625, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
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class members' right to recovery. The plaintiffs in La Sala alleged that
a clause in the standard trust deeds used by the defendant constituted an invalid restraint on alienation. The defendant waived the
clause as to the named plaintiffs, then moved for a dismissal of the
action on the ground that they were no longer representative of the
class. The court rejected the defendant's contention on the basis that
the named plaintiffs had a continuing duty to represent the class even
though their particular claims may have been satisfied. 6
Apparently no cases address the precise question of the immediacy
of a class member's right of recovery, but Daar v. Yellow Cab CoY
and Vasquez v. Superior Court38 both indicate that class members must
come forward and individually prove their damages. 89
It could be argued, in view of this requirement, that the unnamed
plaintiffs' right of recovery is not in fact "immediate" in the sense required by section 2019(a)(4). Some early cases construing the
phrase "immediate benefit" support this argument, although they defined the phrase in the context of resolving a different question, namely,
the competency of witnesses to testify. For instance, in Butler v. Patterson,40 the case from which the Waters court took the "immediate
right to a pro rata share" test,41 the challenged witness was the child
of an intestate decedent. The action involved the child's right to share
in the estate, yet he was found competent to testify. The Butler court
concluded that although the child would not have to do anything after
the action was concluded to establish his claim, his right was not immediate since it was qualified by the administrator's prior right to use
the assets of the estate in its administration.42 The heir's right to the
proceeds in this case would appear to be more "immediate" than the
claim of unnamed plaintiffs in class actions, since they will usually have
to establish their individual damages after the action has been concluded."3
36. 5 Cal. 3d at 871-72, 489 P.2d at 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
37. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
38. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
39. Id. at 809, 484 P.2d at 969, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
40. 13 N.Y. 393, 3 Kern. 292 (1855).
41. See note 32 supra.
42. 13 N.Y. at 394, 3 Kern. at 295 (1855).
43. It is not necessary in every class action that the members of the class come
forward to prove their claims, since in some cases it is possible to determine the members of the class and their individual damages from other sources. See, e.g., San Francisco v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 6 Cal. 3d 119, 490 P.2d 798, 98 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1971)
(company forced to give rebates on telephone bills to all its subscribers).
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The factual settings of these prior cases suggest another argument
against interpreting the phrase to include unnamed plaintiffs: in
all these cases, the person benefited had some close, personal, and substantial interest in the litigation.44 Thus, implicit in the phrase "immediate benefit" would seem to be a requirement that the person to
whom the phrase is applied must have a "close," i.e., immediate, relationship to the action. In the traditional context, such a close relationship
would be inherent in the possibility of a benefit flowing from the action, and it is not surprising, therefore, that such a requirement was not
articulated in the earlier cases. The problem arises only in class actions.
If, however, the Edison court had used either of these arguments to
exclude unnamed plaintiffs from the category of "persons immediately
benefited," defendants would be forced to assume a heavy burden in
class actions, irrespective of whether the factual setting of the case
justified the imposition. By ruling that unnamed plaintiffs fall within
section 2019(a)(4), the court made it possible for the burden of discovery to remain on the named plaintiffs in those situations where justice to the defendant requires it.
Unlike the parties, the court felt that its determination that class actions are prosecuted for the immediate benefit of unnamed plaintiffs
did not dispose of all the issues. A protective order had been issued
by the trial court pursuant to section 2019(b)(1), and the scope of
that section had to be considered. The section states, in relevant part:
Upon motion reasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined . . . for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending may make an order that the deposition shall not be taken,
or that it may be taken only at some designated time or place other than
stated in the notice. . . or the court may make any other order which
the party or witness from annoyance, embarjustice requires to protect
45
rassment, or oppression.
Under this section the issue was whether plaintiffs had shown good
cause for the protective order. If they had, the trial court had not
44. Waters and Butler are both good examples of the usual "closeness" of the person alleged to be benefited by the action. Another common situation in the cases discussed in note 32 supra, was one in which a creditor had made an assignment of a
debt due him, and the assignee, in an action to recover the amount due, called the
assignor as a witness. In both Fitch v. Bates, 11 Barb. 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851)
and Vanduzen v. Worrell, 18 Barb. 409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854), such a witness was determined to be incompetent.
45. 7 Cal. 3d at 840, 500 P.2d at 626, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
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abused its discretion by requiring the defendant to use subpoenas to
compel the unnamed plaintiffs' attendance at the depositions.
The court stated46 that the proper test to determine whether good
cause has been shown should be that given in Greyhound Corp. v. Su47
perior Court:
In the exercise of its discretion the court should weigh the relative importance of the information sought against the hardship which its production might entail, and it must weigh the relative ability of the parties to obtain the information before requiring the adversary to bear the
burden or cost of production, keeping in mind
the statutory admoni48
tion of 'entering an order consistent with justice.
The portion of the Greyhound test applied in Edison is the relative
ability of the parties to obtain the information sought.49 It is a basic
tenet of discovery practice that when both parties have equal ability to
obtain the information, the one seeking it must bear the burden of
producing it. If such equal ability exists, imposing the burden on the
party who is not seeking the information is essentially forcing him to
do the other party's work. As stated in Bunnell v. Superior Court:"°
[W]hen the material to be "discovered" consists . . . solely of infor-

mation available to both parties, it defeats the purpose of the Discovery
Act to compel one party to perform another party's research, whether
such be laborious or not.5 '
Forcing one party to do another's work would result in the type of "annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression" contemplated by section
46. Id. at 841, 500 P.2d at 626, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
47. 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961).
48. Id. at 383-84, 364 P.2d at 280, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 104. The trial court did not
actually exercise its discretion. Rather, it made an erroneous ruling concerning the
meaning of the language of section 2019(a)(4) and based its subsequent action on
that interpretation. This makes little difference, because if the facts of the case support the trial court's action in issuing or denying a particular order, the appellate
court will sustain the order irrespective of the trial court's rationale. Id. at 384, 364
P.2d at 280, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 104; West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.
2d 407, 418, 364 P.2d 295, 300, 15 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124 (1961).
49. The court explicitly stated that the trial court need not consider the importance of the information sought, i.e., the first portion of the quoted test from Greyhound:
Mhe [trial] court decided that the burden of producing the unnamed plaintiffs
for deposition should rest with defendant-without reaching the question of
whether the information sought by Edison is relevant to the class allegation, the
claims for damages on their merits, or both. 7 Cal. 3d at 842, 50D P.2d at 627,
103 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
The trial court did not need to reach this question since it did not deny Edison the
information, it merely required Edison to use subpoenas instead of mere notice to obtain the information from the unnamed plaintiffs.
50. 254 Cal. App. 720, 62 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1967).
51. Id. at 724, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 461-62.
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2019(b)(1). Therefore, a showing of "equal ability" is equivalent
to a showing of "good cause" for the purposes of a protective order
under this section.52
In the Edison context, the "ability to obtain the information" criterion translates into an "ability to compel attendance" test.53 The

named plaintiffs' ability to compel the attendance of unnamed plaintiffs was dependent on the "control" they had over them.54 Since the
class was "loosely knit," and the unnamed plaintiffs were no more

involved with the named plaintiffs than they were with Edison, the
named plaintiffs' ability to compel their attendance through informal

methods was no better than Edison's. 55
The court commented on the "loosely knit" aspect of the class in a
footnote to its opinion:
Our view concerning the proper allocation of the burden of discovery
might be different if the class alleged were a closely organized group,
where the members generally knew each other and participated together in the planning of the lawsuit. 56
This language implies that the burden of producing the deponents

could remain with the named plaintiffs only if both factors are present,
i.e. the members (1) generally know each other and (2) plan the law-

suit together.

If this implication is followed, there will be few class

actions in which the plaintiffs will be unable to obtain a protective or-

der since there will be a minimal number of class actions in which the
criterion that all the class members plan the lawsuit together is present.5 7 Indeed, the concept of "unnamed plaintiffs" inherently implies

non-involvement. Whether this is a valid interpretation of the footnote

58
can be disputed, however, since neither factor was present in Edison.

In a proper case either element alone should provide the control necessary
to justify leaving the burden with the plaintiff.5 9
52. See 7 Cal. 3d at 841-42, 500 P.2d at 626-27, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15; 254 Cal.
App. 2d at 724, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 461-62.
53. 7 Cal. 3d at 84142, 500 P.2d at 626-27, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
54. Id. at 842, 500 P.2d at 627, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
55. Id. at 841-42, 500 P.2d at 626-27, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
56. Id. at 841 n.7, 500 P.2d at 626 n.7, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 714 n.7. (emphasis added).
57. Apparently no reported cases in California meet this requirement.
58. The factual situation in Edison also tends to weaken any too literal reading
of the case: Edison was clearly attempting to use the discovery procedures to exclude
class members from the action. Had this abuse not been present, the court may not
have used terms quite as restrictive as those found in the footnote in question.
59. Clearly, if the second element, i.e., that all the members planned the lawsuit together, is present; the attorneys for the named plaintiffs will have the requisite control over all the class members. Furthermore, if the class members generally know one
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In any event, it is clear that in Edison neither party had any effective
method of informally compelling the attendance of unnamed plaintiffs
for depositions. In such a situation, the parties' ability was as equally
balanced as is possible.
The court could have based its decision sustaining the trial court's
order on the "equal ability" point alone. Instead, the court proceeded
to a discussion of the "new importance" of class actions as a litigation
tool, stating that this consideration requires that class actions be protected from the "chilling effects" 60 which Edison's practices, if sus61
tained, would create.
The "new importance" of class actions is based in part on considerations outlined in Vasquez v. Superior Court,62 one of two cases the
Edison court cited as "presaging" this new importance.6 8 In Vasquez,
the action was brought on behalf of approximately two hundred persons who had bought food freezers and meat on installment sales
contracts. The complaint alleged that these contracts were procured
through fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of the seller.0 4 The
defendant claimed that the action could not be maintained as a class
action since plaintiffs would have to show that the same misrepresentations were made to each member of the class.6 5 In rejecting defendant's
contention, the court stated:
Protection of unwary consumers from being duped by unscrupulous
sellers is an exigency of the utmost priority in contemporary society.
.. . State laws governing relations between consumers and merchants
are generally utilized only by informed, sophisticated parties, affording little practical protection to low income families. The alternatives of multiple litigation (joinder, intervention, consolidation, the
test case) do not sufficiently protect the consumer's rights because the
devices "presuppose 'a group of economically powerful parties who
are obviously able and willing to take care of their own interests individually through individual suits or individual decisions about joinder
or intervention.'

"66

another, the class is probably small, and the members are probably aware of the action and the reasons for bringing it. In such a case, it is a reasonable assumption
that the named plaintiffs will have less difficulty than the defendants in obtaining by
informal means the class members' attendance at depositions.
60. 7 Cal. 3d at 842, 500 P.2d at 627, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
61. Id.
62. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
63. 7 Cal. 3d at 842, 500 P.2d at 627, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
64. 4 Cal. 3d at 805-06, 484 P.2d at 966-67, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 798-99.
65. Id. at 811, 484 P.2d at 970, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
66. Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800 (citations omitted), quoting
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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The second case cited by the Edison court in support of the proposi-

tion that class actions have gained a new importance was Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,6 7 in which the plaintiffs contended that the cab company had overcharged its customers by incorrectly setting the mileage

meters. The defendant attempted to avoid the class action by arguing
that it would be almost impossible to identify the members of the class,
as well as to determine the amount of damages incurred by each individual. As in Vasquez, the court rejected defendant's contentions and
allowed maintenance of the suit.6 The policy consideration suggested
by Daar is that the class action device is necessary to insure that large
companies will answer for injuries to the public where the damages sus-

tained by each individual are so small that suit might not be brought
because it would be economically unfeasible. 69
While the economic factors delineated in Daar and Vasquez are

not as evident in the Edison setting, 70 Edison involves other considerations of public importance supporting the court's protective attitude.

The case has overtones of a "private attorney general" ' 71 suit in which
the plaintiff acts to protect an important public interest in an area

where the state either cannot or will not act. Edison was allegedly polluting-conduct obviously a subject of public interest. 2 Of course,
plaintiffs' action was one for their own damages, but if it were suc67. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
68. Id. at 716-17, 433 P.2d at 747, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
69. Id. at 715, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
70. As a class, it is unlikely that boat owners belonging to a boat association and
mooring their boats in a marina are "unsophisticated" or belong to "low income
families." The Vasquez considerations, therefore, do not apply. Furthermore, the
amount of damages being sought was $5,000,000 compensatory and $5,000,000
exemplary, to be shared by a class of 1500 persons, or roughly $6,600 per person.
7 Cal. 3d at 836, 500 P.2d at 622, 103 Cal. Rptr. 710. Clearly, the amount of
individual damages being sought was more than minimal. Thus Daar economic considerations were also absent in Edison, and the court did not discuss them.
71. The phrase "private attorney general" was coined by Judge Frank in Associated
Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated on suggestion of mootness, 320
U.S. 707 (1943). It has been used most often in the context of whether a private
individual has standing to sue on a cause of action in which his legal injury is no
different than that sustained by the public at large. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940);
K. DAvis, ADMnISTRATIE LAW TREATISE § 22.09-6, at 750 (Supp. 1970); L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMnISTRATIVE ACTON 517 (1965); Note, Standing And EnvironmentalLitigation, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 128, 142 n.105 (1973).
72. In 1971, the California legislature enacted Government Code section 12,600
which is a statement of California's policy favoring protection of the environment,
CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. § 12,600 (West Supp. 1973).
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cessful the public would benefit incidentally. The effect of the pollution could not possibly have been limited to damage of the boats in
the marina, and a substantial monetary recovery by the plaintiffs would
tend to make Edison less likely to pollute in the future. Considerations
of this nature are indicative of the strong public inteiest in maintaining
78
the class action as a viable litigation tool.
The court found that Edison's discovery procedures could undermine the viability of class actions in two ways, "either by imposing
impossibly expensive burdens on the named plaintiffs or by chipping
away at the size of the class through exclusion of the unnamed plain-

tiffs." 7 4

The threat of exclusion of non-appearing class members arises under
the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034(d), which states,
in part:
If a party or a person for whose immediate benefit the action . . . is
prosecuted or defended . . .willfully fails to appear before the officer
who is to take his deposition, after said party or his attorney has been
served with a proper notice in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (a) (4) of Section 2019 . . .the court on motion and notice may
. . . dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a
judgment by default against that party, or impose such other penalties
of a lesser nature as the court may deem just.7 5
Since this power to exclude can be exercised only where the failure to
appear is willful,7" the trial court in Edison could not have excluded
73. A wide variety of policy considerations outside the consumer protection and
environmental fields can be served by class actions. See, e.g., Collins v. Rocha, 7
Cal. 3d 232, 497 P.2d 225, 102 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972) (nine named plaintiffs, on
behalf of themselves and thirty-five others, sought recovery from a farm labor contractor who had induced them to travel approximately 400 miles with the promise of
at least one week of work, then gave them only three hours of work); Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (seeking declaration that
state public school financing methods were unconstitutional, brought on behalf of the
school children of the state); Los Angeles Fire & Police Protective League v. City of
Los Angeles, 23 Cal. App. 3d 67, 99 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1972) (action to collect overtime worked, but not paid, brought on behalf of all Los Angeles city policemen);
Reaves v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 587, 99 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1971) (attacking
the superior court's procedures for handling extraordinary writs, brought on behalf
of all those who had sought, might have sought, will seek, and might seek, such writs in
the defendant court). See also Note, The Cost-InternalizationCase for Class Actions,
21 STAN. L. REv. 383 (1969).
74. 7 Cal. 3d at 842, 500 P.2d at 627, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
75. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2034(d) (West Supp. 1973).
76. See, e.g., Palmer v. Moore, 266 Cal. App. 2d 134, 71 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1968),
in which it was stated:
[Defendant] could not be located .. . [and] consequently, his failure to answer
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those members of the class who could not be contacted, and probably

could not have excluded those who could not appear. Where the failure is willful, as it apparently was with those who "refused to appear,"" it is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether or not

the sanction should be imposed. In individual actions, the imposition of
such a sanction is considered to be a drastic measure to be used only in
the most extreme circumstances.78 Therefore, even prior to Edison, the
threat of a defendant "chipping away" at the size of the class through
the use of section 2034(d) seemed more apparent than real. The Edison court's discussion of the need to avoid the "chilling" of class actions which the exclusion of class members undoubtedly would have,
forcefully emphasizes the drastic nature of the sanction in the class action context and makes the possibility of imposing the sanction even

less likely than it might be in individual actions."9

The second "chilling!' effect the court discussed was that which
could occur by placing "impossibly expensive' burdens on the named

plaintiffs.8 0 Since the number of possible deponents in a class action
could be quite large, the amount of time and money required to insure

their attendance at depositions could easily become prohibitive.

In

the instant case, the named plaintiffs' counsel had expended "extraordinary time and effort to round up" the unnamed members of the
class involved, and yet had been required to reach only twenty of 1500
possible deponents.8 1 Had the court left the burden on the named
the interrogatories was not wilful. And the section in question [2034(d)] requires,
before there can be a default, that such failure must be wilful. Id. at 141, 71
Cal. Rptr. at 806.
77. 7 Cal. 3d at 836, 500 P.2d at 623, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
78. See, e.g., Scherrer v. Plaza Marina Commercial Corp., 16 Cal. App. 3d 520, 94
Cal. Rptr. 85 (1971).
79. A literal reading of section 2034(d) indicates that if an unnamed plaintiff wilfully fails to appear for the deposition, the trial court could in its discretion, enter
a default against the named plaintiffs. This would result in more than merely "chipping away" at the class: it would destroy the present action entirely, although it is
doubtful that such a default would have any effect on the ability of other members
of the class to bring a later action. Nonetheless, the chilling effect which the imposition of such a sanction could have is obvious. In every large class, it would be reasonable to expect that there would be at least one obstinate individual who would
"willfully fail to appear" for the deposition, and thus cause a default to be entered
against the named plaintiffs. Of course, the likelihood of a court imposing this sanction is at best remote, and after Edison, likely non-existent.
80. 7 Cal. 3d at 842, 500 P.2d at 627, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
81. Id., 500 P.2d at 627, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 715. It should be noted that in a pure
discovery context, a showing of burden alone is not sufficient to shift the burden of
discovery to the other party. As was stated in West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior
Court, 56 Cal. 2d 407, 364 P.2d 295, 15 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1961):
Each of the [discovery] sections grants the power to make such [protective] orders
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plaintiffs, many prospective plaintiffs and attorneys would carefully
avoid instigating any class action involving a substantial number of
class members. Such a result might indeed have a "chilling" effect on

class actions. In light of the court's protective attitude toward class
actions, this threat justified the trial court's issuance of the protective

order.
As a final argument on appeal, the plaintiffs requested the court to
rule that in class actions the defendant should always have the burden of showing good cause for the taking of depositions.8 2 This the
court refused to do. The refusal was based on the language of section

2019(b) (1) which squarely places this burden on the Edison plaintiffs: "Upon motion reasonably made . . . by the party to be exam-

ined [and] for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make a protective order." The court stated:
This is a statute whose language clearly indicates that the burden of
showing "good cause" . . . for a protective order rests on the party
seeking to deny the other's discovery right. We will not reverse this
statutorily created burden. .... 83
The practical importance of this holding is to some degree dependent

on the weight given to the footnote in the court's opinion which implied that a protective order shifting the burden of discovery to the de-

fendant would issue unless the class is "closely knit" in the sense that
the class members generally know one another and plan the lawsuit together.s4 If the footnote is given this interpretation, the court's re-

fusal has little effect: the plaintiffs' ability to obtain a protective order
is virtually guaranteed.8 5 On the other hand, if the statement in the
as justice requires, but none of them so much as refers to "burden." This indicates
a legislative acknowledgment that some burden is inherent in all demands for
discovery. The objection of burden is valid only when that burden is demonstrated
to result in injustice. Hence, the trial court is not empowered to sustain an objection in toto, when the same is predicated upon burden, unless such is the only
method of rendering substantial justice. Id. at 418, 364 P.2d at 300, 15 Cal. Rptr.
at 124.
In Edison, the finding that the plaintiffs had expended "extraordinary time and effort"
in trying to meet their obligations under section 2019(a)(4) probably would have
satisfied the West Pico test even if Edison had been an individual action, and, therefore,
a protective order would have been appropriate. On the question of a showing of
burden as good cause for a protective order, see Hauk v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. 2d
295, 391 P.2d 825, 38 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1964); Pantzalas v. Superior Court, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 499, 77 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969); Alpine Mut. Water Co. v. Superior Court, 259
Cal. App. 2d 45, 66 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1968).
82. 7 Cal. 3d at 842, 500 P.2d at 627, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
83. Id., 500 P.2d at 628, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
84. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
85. See note 57 and text accompanying notes 56-58 supra. Plaintiff will have to make
a factual showing that the class members did not plan the lawsuit together, but
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footnote is given less emphasis, the plaintiffs' burden of showing good
cause could become somewhat greater. They might be required to
show that they have little, if any, control over the class members and

cannot compel their attendance by informal means. While this would
be an easy burden in most class actions, there are at least some sit-

uations where the plaintiffs arguably could not meet it. 6 But under

either interpretation of the footnote, there will be a far greater number
of cases where the plaintiffs can sustain this burden than where they
cannot. While the court, as a matter of judicial discretion, would
not reverse this statutorily created burden of showing good cause, the

practical effect of the decision will be to force defendants to compel
the attendance of deponents in all but the most extreme situations.
But where does this leave the defendant who legitimately needs information from and about unnamed plaintiffs? 8 7 It is unlikely that he
this requirement does not seem to make his task any more onerous than resisting
a demurrer to the bringing of a typical class action as such. The requirement
of a factual showing of good cause is discussed in Carlson v. Superior Court, 56
Cal. 2d 431, 440, 364 P.2d 308, 313, 15 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137 (1961). See also Rosen
v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. App. 2d 586, 53 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1966). Code of Civil Procedure section 2036(a) states: "A party required to show 'good cause' to obtain discovery ... shall show specific facts justifying discovery." CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc.
§ 2036(a) (West Supp. 1973). While this section does not on its face apply to Edison since it is limited to situations where good cause must be shown to obtain disovery, whereas in Edison denial of discovery was sought, the Edison court seemed to
feel that the section was applicable nonetheless. 7 Cal. 3d at 843, 500 P.2d at 628.
86. See, e.g., Collins v. Rocha, 7 Cal. 3d 232, 497 P.2d 225, 102 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972)
in which there were only thirty-five unnamed plaintiffs, all of whom appeared to be at
least acquaintances of the named plaintiffs.
87. This question assumes that unnamed plaintiffs can in fact supply useful information to the defendant: "Defendants [in class actions aimed at business practices]
are disadvantaged in discovery since there are usually very few questions they can
ask." Masterson, Class Actions-The Defense Viewpoint, 47 L.A. B. BULL. 425,
430 (1972). But the recent experiences of the federal courts seem to indicate
that some useful information is available. In certain federal cases, it has been the
court itself which solicited the information, not the parties. The rule relied on,
when one is given, is Rule 23(d) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather
than the discovery rules (Rules 26-37). Rule 23 authorizes and defines class actions, and subsection (d) (3) allows the court in such an action to make orders providing for notice to members of the class in order to protect their interests during the
.onduct of the action. Using this rule as justification, the federal courts have, during
the pretrial period, sent "Proof of Claim" forms to the unnamed plaintiffs requesting
information concerning the individual's claim and status within the class. (For criticism of this practice, see 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES
158-61 (1972); cf. 3B MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23-1161 (2d ed. 1969)). In
short, federal courts are using discovery-like devices to obtain from unnamed plaintiffs, information useful to some aspect of the case, either procedural or substantive.
For instance, in Kor v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), later ruling,
92,845, at 90,167 (1970), rev'd, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
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will wish to subpoena them for depositions; the burden will be as heavy

on him as it would have been on the plaintiffs in Edison. One solution might be to direct interrogatories to the unnamed plaintiffs; however, the code section relating to interrogatories limits their use to
"other parties." The defendant will be blocked from using this ap-

proach unless the court is willing to consider unnamed plaintiffs
as "parties" for discovery purposes, a possibility that seems quite un88
likely.
The function of class actions is to provide an efficient method of
handling a large number of comparatively small claims based on
similar facts and questions of law. Inherent in this concept is the notion that unnamed plaintiffs should not be required to retain counsel,
appear before the court, or otherwise become actively involved in the
prosecution of the case. In discussing the federal rule which authorizes class actions, the federal district court in Fischer v. Wolfinbarger89 explained:
1972), the court found, through the use of Proof of Claim forms, that a large number
of prospective class members had signed releases of liability, thus bringing into focus
the substantive question of the validity of the releases. In Arey v. Providence Hosp.,
55 F.R.D. 62 (1972), in which the defendant was being sued for alleged discriminatory hiring and promotion practices, the court stated:
Mhis court believes feedback from the known class members would be instructive and aid the court by providing information as to the scope of the class and the
scope and diversity of discrimination claims, thereby allowing the court to rule
more intelligently in future determinations regarding the boundaries of the class,
the need for sub-classes, or even a re-evaluation of the class status designation itself. Id. at 71.
While the type of information the Arey court was seeking is usually available to the
defendant directly from the named plaintiffs, he would clearly benefit if he, like the
Arey court, could go directly to the ultimate source of the information, i.e., the
unnamed plaintiffs. See also Mack v. General Elec. Co., 15 FED. RULES SERv. 2d 23c.
22 at 799 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 1971); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D.
559 (D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D.
452 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966)
88. The federal court of appeals for the 7th circuit seems to have done so, however. While not actually stating that unnamed plaintiffs are "parties," that court, in
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), sustained
the use of interrogatories directed to the unnamed plaintiffs even though the federal
rule authorizing interrogatories (Fmn. R. Civ. P. 33) limits their use to "parties."
Brennan has received a great deal of criticism. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco
Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972); 1971 DUKE L.J. 1007; 40 FORDHAM L. REV.
969 (1971). The court in Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62 (1972), commented:
The court specifically refrains from delving into the procedural quagmire created
by a quite recent case [Brennan] dealing with affirmative action requirements for
non-present class members. Id. at 71 n.16.
89. 15 Fim. RULES Smwv. 2d 23d.5, at 905 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 5, 1971).
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[The federal class action rule] is designed to provide a fair and efficient procedure for handling claims where the claims or defenses of the
represented parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
where there are questions of law or fact common to the class, and where
it is fair to conclude that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. It is not intended that members of the class should be treated as if they were parties plaintiff,
subject to the normal discovery procedures, because if that were permitted, then the reason for the rule would fail.90
If the court were to hold that unnamed plaintiffs are parties for the
purpose of discovery, allowing the defendant to direct interrogatories
to them, the entire concept of the class action could be subverted. Only
an attorney could properly advise the unnamed plaintiffs as to the relevance, importance, and purpose of the questions being asked. Thus,
the unnamed plaintiffs would be forced to become involved in the entire
process of answering interrogatories and perhaps seeking protective
orders. Furthermore, the attorneys for the plaintiffs would be faced
with the added burden of actively advising the unnamed plaintiffs. 1
These considerations make it highly unlikely that the court would conclude that unnamed plaintiffs are "parties," especially in light of the
"new importance" of class actions in California. 2
The one remaining method by which the defendant may be able to
obtain information about unnamed plaintiffs' individual claims is to
direct interrogatories to the named plaintiffs with the hope that they
will obtain the information from the other class members. The Edison court made reference to this method when it approved the holding in Alpine Mutual Water Co. v. Superior Court:9"
We agree with the following statements in [Alpine] . . . : "Absent
some specific showing by the objecting party to justify a contrary rul90. Id. at 907.
91. Even if the unnamed plaintiffs are considered "parties" within the meaning
of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030 and are therefore persons to whom interrogatories can be directed, the court would probably hold that the representative attorney is the attorney of record for all members of the class who do not indicate
otherwise, in order to protect the class members' interests in the action. In such
a situation, the defendant could not go directly to the unnamed plaintiffs without
the permission of the representative attorney. Otherwise, unadvised class members
might fail to answer at all or unsuspectingly answer to their detriment. This would
clearly pose a threat of abuse and harassment to the class members. On the obligation to communicate through the adversary's counsel, see Turner v. State Bar, 36 Cal.
2d 155, 222 P.2d 857 (1950); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN.foil. § 6076, Rule 12
(West 1962); ABA CODE OF PROFESSioNAL REsPoNsiiLrrY § DR 7-104 (1969).
92. See text accompanying notes 62-73 supra.
93. 259 Cal. App. 2d 45, 66 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1968).
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ing, such as privilege, a representative plaintiff can be compelled to
supply his adversary with the information about his class which is in
his possession or readily available to him and which is not equally avail-

able to an adversary. A representative plaintiff cannot be compelled
to supply information concerning members of his class or their interests in the action which is neither in his possession nor control, unless
the interrogatory is directly related to his own standing to maintain
the action, to the existence of an ascertainable class, or to the existence of that community of interest which is required to sustain a class

action. A representative cannot be compelled to respond to interrogatories about any class member's separate claim as distinguished
from the common claim of the class which may be tried with or as a
part of the class action." 94

The language quoted from Alpine indicates that if the information is either in the possession of or readily available to the named plaintiffs,
and is not equally available to the defendant, then the named plaintiffs
can be forced to provide it upon request by the defendant, even if the
information concerns unnamed plaintiffs' individual claims. Thus, in-

formation in the named plaintiffs' possession is clearly discoverable as
it is in individual actions,95 but if the information is not in the named
plaintiffs' actual possession, they will be able to obtain it only by going
to the unnamed plaintiffs themselves. Then the "control" argument developed in Edison becomes applicable: practically speaking, the information is "readily available" to the named plaintiffs only if the class
is "closely knit". Thus, the "readily available" standard enunciated
in Alpine can be said to limit the use of interrogatories for obtaining
information about unnamed plaintiffs' individual claims to the same
situation where depositions on mere notice to the named plaintiffs
were proper and not unduly burdensome in Edison.90 On the other
hand, if the information is not in the control or possession of the named
plaintiffs, the Alpine opinion indicates the defendant will still be able
to force the named plaintiffs to obtain information, but only if the information sought relates to the plaintiffs' own standing to maintain the
action, the existence of an ascertainable class, or the community of interest necessary to sustain the class action. The Alpine court expressly
excluded interrogatories concerning individual claims from falling
within this exception; 97 thus again the defendant who seeks specific
94. 7 Cal. 3d at 841 n.7, 500 P.2d at 626-27 n.7, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15 n.7.
(emphasis added and citations omitted by Edison court).
95. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
97. 259 Cal. App. 2d at 54-55, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
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information about the unnamed class members will be blocked from
doing so.
The Edison court clearly reached the proper result. The ability of

the parties to compel the attendance of unnamed plaintiffs was equal,
and, therefore, the party seeking the information should have been
left, as he was, with the burden of discovery; however, a defendant
who wishes to obtain information about unnamed plaintiffs will find
himself in a difficult position, despite the fact that the Edison court up-

held his abstract "right of discovery" on mere notice. When the discovery statutes and the nature of class actions are considered together,

the defendant is left with only one effective method of discovery from
unnamed plaintiffs: he must subpoena and depose each class member
8
from whom he desires non-class information.
M. Yance Hirschi
98. The defendant in Edison in fact attempted to use a subpoena procedure to
compel the attendance of unnamed plaintiffs at depositions. The subpoenas were
to be accompanied by a letter explaining the underlying cause of action and by a
"Declaration Waiving Claim." By signing this Declaration, the unnamed plaintiff
to whom the subpoena was directed would both waive his claim and avoid the
necessity of appearing at his deposition. The named plaintiffs again sought a protective order, which the trial court refused to grant. The court of appeal in Carlson
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 640, 109 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1973), reversed. The
apparent rationale for reversal was that:
the either/or nature of the notice used here, reinforced as it is by inclusion of
the waiver form, which encourages unnamed plaintiffs to "opt out" of the class
at the discovery stage rather than to submit to deposition proceedings (id. at 651,
109 Cal. Rptr. at 247),
was designed to "chip away at the size of the class," a motive which the court felt was
disallowed by Edison. Id. at 649, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
The Carlson decision is wrong. Justice Allport, in dissent, noted that the procedure
Edison was attempting to use provided a convenient, quick, and inexpensive method by
which unwilling class members could opt out of the action. He further noted that without allowing the unnamed plaintiffs to opt out in this manner, they have no choice but
to attend the deposition, and that a refusal to do so will subject them to all the liabilities
associated with the refusal to obey a subpoena, including the possibility of contempt
and dismissal of the action with respect to the individual's claim. Id. at 651-53, 109
Cal. Rptr. at 247-48. Also see note 79, supra.
Furthermore, if the decisions are to be consistent, a logical extension of the
Carlson decision would be that no one could be allowed to mention the class member's
right to opt out in the subpoena or accompanying documents. After all, the reason
the court gave for reversal was that the Declaration "encouraged" unnamed plaintiffs
to opt out. Certainly, if their right to do so is mentioned in the subpoena, they will
still be "encouraged" to opt out, although it might require a phone call or even writing
a letter instead of just signing a form. If this is in fact a proper interpretation of
Carlson, then the decision requires that unnamed plaintiffs not be informed of their
rights. The ludicrous nature of this suggestion certainly strengthens the force of
Justice Allport's dissent.
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Another point indicating the erroneous nature of the decision is that the holding
will, in all probability, have only a slight effect on the ultimate size of the class. At
some time during the pre-trial period, the unnamed plaintiffs are going to learn that
they have a right to opt out of the class, despite the Carlson court's attempt to keep
this information from them. Most of those who would have exercised this right via
the Declaration Waiving Claim will still do so, either because they feel they have no
claim, or because they wish to avoid the litigation in which they will be involved,
assuming the named plaintiffs are successful on the merits, when it comes times to prove
their individual claims. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the court's
"chipping away at the size of the class" argument has no valid basis.

